The US critical minerals drive is ramping up – a $12 bn Project Vault proposal, trade bloc ideas, DLA reactivation, and partnerships with resource rich countries. What is next, which minerals matter, and what are the risks? We explore these below.
US ramps up critical mineral policy in early February
While geology transcends borders, an increasingly polarised and technology-driven world is putting critical mineral security at the forefront of geopolitics. Early February saw a flurry of US critical minerals activity, combining stockpiling, public-private capital and dealmaking in the name of supply security.
‘Project Vault’ was announced on 2 February – a proposed $12 bn public-private initiative to mitigate supply shocks. On 3 February, a US-backed consortium signed a non-binding MoU over the potential acquisition of stakes in major Congolese copper mines. Then, on 4 February, US Vice President JD Vance unveiled plans for a trade bloc at Critical Minerals Ministerial in Washington. Reportedly attending this Washington event on 4 February were representatives from 54 countries and the EU, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio also announcing a partnership to coordinate critical minerals policy known as FORGE.
A critical mineral trade bloc is a novel idea – using tariffs to enforce coordinated price floors, it could enhance the viability of domestic projects and reduce exposure to price fluctuations. How many nations sign up to such an arrangement will be key to its bargaining power. So far, Washington announced it has signed bilateral agreements with 11 countries and completed negotiations with another 17, with key players including the EU, Japan, Korea and Mexico.
Countries and companies turn to stockpiles
While mineral stockpiling is not new, Project Vault’s public-private financing makes it a distinctive concept. President Trump likened it to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, which was created in the 1970’s after an oil embargo, acting as a backstop to be drawn down in times of emergency.
Details remain scarce at this stage, though it is reported that $2 bn capital has been raised privately, while the US Export-Import Bank will provide the remainder. Companies would reportedly commit to buying materials later at a fixed price, giving Project Vault a list of required materials, which will subsequently be purchased and stored. Companies could draw down stocks as needed, so long as they agree to replenish the same amount of material in the future at the same price.
It has been reported that this US critical mineral stockpile will target around two months’ worth of demand across “all” critical minerals – the USGS identifies 60. By combining US demand and prices, we estimate what proportion of capital would be required for each commodity. In general, higher-tonnage markets would comprise a larger share of the total stockpile value, with roughly half of the capital required to build a copper and aluminium stockpile alone. Equating to ~1 Mt of combined copper and aluminium stock, or ~1% of global demand for each market, it may not sound that significant but certainly it is – given booming copper demand and prevailing tightness in the US primary aluminium market. Soaring prices and growing demand mean that silver would represent the third-largest exposure, while much-discussed rare earth elements (REE) would comprise only a fraction of total value.
In addition to Project Vault, the US government’s traditional stockpiling arm, the DLA, is re-engaging – expressing interest in purchasing various minerals including antimony, tantalum, scandium and cobalt. Many countries are following suit – Australia announced a similar plan in January, while the EU proposed strategic purchasing in December.
While this marks a turning point in US policy following years of destocking, an initial DLA cobalt tender was postponed late last year amid issues surrounding pricing and procurement specifications. Cobalt is illustrative of how post-war US critical minerals holdings have evolved. At their peak in the 1960’s, DLA stocks could satisfy more than ten years’ worth of US consumption. Today, those stocks have been drawn down to almost zero.
Where is the US most exposed?
The rationale behind these policies is the US reliance on imports. Of 19 key commodity markets, America is totally reliant on imports for graphite, gallium, tantalum and manganese, and is partially exposed to another 14, with beryllium being the only market where the US is self-sufficient. Given that less-exposed, large-tonnage and high-capital markets such as copper, aluminium and lead are exchange-listed, it begs the question whether two months of demand would really be required. This is in comparison to markets like tantalum or gallium, which are low-tonnage and low-capital, where the US is more exposed.
From announcements to execution
As these measures are still in their early stage, many questions remain regarding how they would work in practice. What would the policies mean for existing offtake agreements, would prices be impacted by additional demand, over what timeframe and where would the minerals come from? Notable deals have been signed with nations like Argentina – an emerging copper and lithium producer.
The DRC seems to be a key ally following a December agreement involving US priority access to DRC projects and offtake – a deal which is now seemingly being executed. On 3 February, US-backed Orion Critical Mineral Consortium (involving the US Development Finance Corporation) signed a non-binding MoU with Glencore for a potential acquisition of a 40% stake in Glencore’s interest in the Mutanda Cu-Co and Kamoto Cu-Co mines. Similarly, Virtus Minerals – a company led by US military and intelligence veterans – is reportedly close to striking a deal for DRC Cu-Co miner Chemaf following prior attempts from Chinese and Congolese state-owned enterprises. If completed, these deals would represent the first US-held equity stakes in major Congolese mines since Freeport-McMoran sold its stake in Tenke Fungurume and Kisanfu just before President Trump’s first term in 2016.
Again, the cobalt market illustrates how US influence is growing. 2025 Q1 saw equity stakes of DRC exports at 58% for Chinese companies. This year, the US-DRC minerals deal and export quotas have shifted the balance, with combined DRC state-owned entity and European company stakes exceeding Chinese counterparts. Under the December deal, much DRC SOE cobalt could end up in the US, with 2026 volumes alone equating to three years of US demand, meaning stockpiles could theoretically be built in a short timeframe.
A key uncertainty lies in what forms would be stored and who would control release conditions. Congolese cobalt comes in the form of hydroxide – an intermediate product for which the US currently has limited processing capacity. Rare earths are another example – while the country imports 80% of its REE compounds and metals, it is a major concentrate producer.
Ultimately, execution will determine whether these initiatives strengthen resilience or simply shift risk. Stockpiling and coordinated trade measures can protect against shocks and improve investment signals, but they are difficult to implement. Clear rules and decision making will be required. Most importantly, inventories are not a substitute for industrial capacity – without investment in mines, processing and downstream value chains, stockpiles only buy time.
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