Author

Iwalade Adio
Africa Americas Asia Europe Middle East Copper Battery Materials Lithium Rare Earth Metals Iron Ore Risk Management and Compliance Leadership and Influence Policy making and lobbying Batteries Chemicals

The text below is  adapted from 'Critical mineral strategies: Evaluating progress and the road ahead', by Piyush Goel, Ionut Lazar, Frank Eich and Mark Jeavons from the CRU Breakfast Companion 2026, the publication that accompanies our annual CRU Breakfast event. Download the full publication or speak to a CRU expert.

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Governments are seeking to reduce their reliance on China for critical minerals, but the appropriate diversification policy will vary by commodity. Targeted financial support is accelerating investment in ex. China rare earth supply chains. In larger markets such as copper and lithium refining, however, the scale and cost of investment mean that direct financial incentives will need to be supplemented with non-financial incentives. CRU forecasts that China will retain a dominant position in both markets in 2030.

Completely decoupling supply chains is unlikely. The more practical objective is to develop alternative sources and reduce exposure to concentrated supply, using policies suited to each commodity.

Why can’t governments support every critical mineral the same way?

Government interventions broadly fall into two categories financial and non-financial. While both these interventions generally work in conjunction, the appropriate balance between the two depends on each commodity’s supply chain risk and cost of government intervention.

In this instance, the cost of government intervention refers to the financial cost for the government to participate as a producer or as an investor to mitigate supply chain risks. Similarly, not all commodities require government support. CRU’s critical metals risk matrix assesses commodities against these two dimensions, helping identify where intervention is required and which intervention may be most effective.

 

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Critical metals risk matrix. Data: CRU

Iron ore, for example, is widely available and presents relatively low supply chain risk, making governmental intervention harder to justify.

Gallium on other extreme is a smaller market with high supply chain concentration, requiring targeted financial incentives. This is because the market has low volumes and entry barriers. Subsequently a few capacity additions could create oversupply, deterring private investment. Targeted financial support for selected producers may therefore be needed to encourage production.

CRU estimates that if gallium were recovered as a by-product from all alumina refineries currently in operation we could annually produce more than 20,000 tonnes annually, compared with a current market of just under 1,000 tonnes of gallium contained.

Are government incentives reducing China’s share of rare earth supply?

Rare earths show how targeted intervention can accelerate alternative supply. Investment outside China has increased following China’s trade restrictions, supported by US government measures including loans, equity partnerships and price floors.

Examples include the US government’s equity stake in MP Materials and a $620 million loan announced for Vulcan Elements to support permanent magnet production. Price floors for MP Materials and USA Rare Earth are intended to reduce the risk that oversupply from China depresses prices and undermines the viability of alternative producers.

CRU forecasts that China’s share of separated light rare earth supply will fall from 88% in 2025 to 77% in 2030. Its share of separated heavy rare earth supply is also projected to decline, from 99% to 77%.

 

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Separated rare earth supply by region (%). Source: CRU REE Special Report 2026

These are forecasts, not completed changes in market share. They indicate the potential impact of financial and non-financial measures, including permitting reforms and multilateral agreements. New capacity, however, takes time to build and qualify for strategic end uses.

Related: Special Report: Rare Earth Elements 


Why is diversifying copper and lithium refining harder?

The challenge is greater in larger midstream markets. CRU forecasts that China’s share of refined lithium production will increase from 73% in 2025 to 76% in 2030. Its share of refined copper production is projected to edge down from 48% to 46%.

Copper refining economics help explain the difficulty. Treatment and refining charges (TC/RCs) are close to record lows, while revenue from by-products such as gold and sulphuric acid is volatile. Higher operating costs, including those associated with stricter environmental standards, add pressure in developed markets.

Developing alternative capacity will require financial and non-financial incentives, alongside sustained private-sector investment. Bilateral agreements with lower-cost emerging economies and equity partnerships may help mobilise the capital needed for commercially viable processing capacity.

What would make critical mineral diversification succeed?

There is no single policy that will work across every commodity. Governments need to match intervention to each market’s supply chain risks and economics, while creating conditions that attract long-term private investment.

CRU sees meaningful progress in reducing rare earth supply chain risks as possible in the short to medium term, although new plants still need time to build and qualify. For high-risk, high-cost markets such as copper and lithium, progress is less likely in the medium term and depends on mobilising sufficient capital over a longer period along with appropriate non-financial measures.

Diversifying critical mineral supply chains beyond China is therefore a gradual, commodity-specific process. The aim is not complete decoupling, but more resilient supply through targeted policy support and commercially sustainable investment.

Want to understand what these developments mean for your business? Read the CRU Breakfast Companion for eight commodity outlooks, including copper and lithium, or speak to a CRU expert.

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